Pembunuhan Beramai-ramai di No Gun Ri

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Pembunuhan Beramai-ramai di No Gun Ri
Hangul 노근리 양민학살사건[1]
Hanja 老斤里良民虐殺事件
Perumian Semakan Nogeun-ri yangmin halsal sageon
McCune–Reischauer Nogŭn-ri yangmin halsal sagŏn

Pembunuhan No Gun Ri ialah suatu insiden yang menyayat hati dalam sejarah peperangan dunia. Pembunuhan beramai-ramai ini telah terjadi ketika Perang Korea. Seramai 8 hingga 300 orang awam Korea Selatan yang tidak berdosa telah dibunuh dengan kejam oleh tentera Amerika Syarikat.[1] Pembunuhan telah dilakukan oleh para askar Regimen Kavalri ke-7 Amerika Syarkat (U.S. 7th Cavalry Regiment) di antara tanggal 1950-07-26 dan 1950-07-29 berdekatan perkampungan yang dikenali sebagai No Gun Ri. Insiden kekejaman tentera Amerika ini telah mendapat liputan hebat dan perhatian yang serius daripada Associated Press (sebuah syarikat akhbar terkenal Amerika Syarikat). Rencana pendedahan ini telah dikeluarkan secara bersiri pada tahun 1999 dan akhirnya berjaya memenangi Hadiah Pulitzer untuk anugerah laporan penyiasatan terbaik.[2] Perkampungan No Gun Ri terletak di Hwanggan-myeon, Kaunti Yeongdong, Chungcheongbuk-do, di pedalaman Korea Selatan.

Dalam hari-hari pertama dalam tragedi Perang Korea, kumpulan pelarian telah bergerak bebas untuk melalui jalan awam bagi aktiviti harian mereka seperti ke kebun, kedai dan sebagainya. Namun tentera Amerika Syarikat telah menahan mereka (orang awam) supaya jangan melalui kawasan tersebut kerana atas alasan tentera Amerika telah menandakan kawasan sempadan diantara laluan tentera Amerika dan penduduk awam sedangkan tiada perjanjian yang pernah dibuat untuk dipersetujui atas perkara tersebut. Pihak tentera Amerika Syarikat sengaja membina garis Amerika tanpa keizinan dari penduduk tempatan. Askar Amerika Syarikat dalam pada itu telah berperasangka buruk dengan mengesyaki bahawa kumpulan-kumpulan seperti itu (orang awam) telah disusupi oleh tentera Korea Utara, namun itu tidak benar. Walaubagaimanapun jumlah kematian yang dicatatkan akibat pembuhan kejam oleh Amerika Syarikat tidak dicatatkan secara tepat kerana sumber sebenar jumlah kematian tepat di No Gun Ri disimpan oleh pemerintah Amerika Syarikat dan tidak di khabarkan pada umum, berdasarkan laporan terkini dari New York Times.[3] Pada tahun 1999, sebuah rencana dalam Associated Press telah menuduh tentera Amerika Syarikat telah membunuh, mengebom dan menembak para pelarian di No Gun Ri dari arah udara dan darat dengan menggunakan mesin penembak dari jarak dekat yang dibuat di bawah arahan dasar ketenteraan di Korea Selatan oleh Jabatan Ketenteraan Amerika Syarikat. Tuduhan ini amat berasas, kerana terdapat bukti yang kuat yang dapat ditentu sahihkan dalam perkara ini misalnya terdapatnya pengakuan langsung dari askar vateran Amerika Syarikat yang menganjurkan dan melakukan pembunuhan, saksi yang melihat kejadian dan mengalami sendiri tragedi dari kalangan penduduk No Gun Ri yang terselamat dari pembunuhan dan surat arahan yang dikeluarkan dari Jabatan Ketenteraan Amerika Syarikat yang masih tersimpan di Perpustakaan Washington. (berdasarkan penayangan laporan dari History (saluran TV Asia Tenggara)), namun begitu, pemerintah Amerika Syarikat di Rumah Putih terus menafikan perihal tersebut dengan mengatakan bahawa laporan AP itu sebahagiannya berdasarkan akaun langsung yang dipalsukan oleh Edward Daily.[2] Rekod tentera Amerika Syarikat pula membuat cadangan bahawa Daily bukannya seorang penembak Machine gun dan tidak pernah datang ke No Gun Ri.[4] Surat AP seterusnya telah membetuli kenyatan salah yang dikeluarkan oleh Daily dan apa-apa artikel berkenaan dengan insiden pembunuhan di No Gun Ri.

Pada tahun 2001, tentera AS telah memberi respon terhadap akaun AP dengan laporan yang terperinci termasuk foto udara yang diambil pada tarikh 6 Ogos 1950 dan September 19, 1950.[5] Menurut analisis citra hawa Tentera Darat Amerika Syarikat menyimpulkan tidak ada sebarang bukti tubuh (mayat) atau perkuburan semasa, walaupun ada bukti pemberondongan dari serangan udara pada tarikh yang tak tentu di tempat berkenaan.[3][5] Kerana pihak tentera Amerika memberi alasan bahawa kematian yang besar yang melibatkan ramai kematian bukan mudah untuk diurai dengan cepat, pihak tentera Amerka Syarikat dalam laporannya telah menganggarkan jumlah kematian yang berlaku dalam insiden No Gun Ri tidak lebih daripada 50 orang pelarian awam yang terbunuh. Laporan AP memberi respon bahawa tubuh badan yang selebihnya mungkin telah diletakkan di bawah jambatan dan di bawa lari oleh penduduk selepas pembunuhan yang berlaku selama 3 hari 3 malam. Surat khabar Korea Utara dalam rencananya telah melaporkan sebanyak 400 orang awam yang tidak berdosa telah dibunuh dengan sengaja oleh tentera Amerika Syarikat. Laporan akhbar ini telah dibuat selepas 3 minggu pembunuhan beramai-ramai berakhir.[3] Laporan dari Tentera Korea Utara telah menganggarkan lebih daripada 150 orang awam telah dibunuh dengan sengaja oleh tentera Amerika Syarikat.[6]

Kontroversi yang timbul akibat Insiden[sunting | sunting sumber]

Fail:NoGunRi AreaMap.jpg
Map of South Korea with No Gun Ri area noted. Source: Report of the No Gun Ri Review, US Army Inspector General, Map 1
Fail:NoGunRi AreaMap2.jpg
Map of the No Gun Ri area with the alleged strafing areas and the double tunnel railroad overpass marked. Source: Report of the No Gun Ri Review, US Army Inspector General, Map 2

Berikut adalah judul buku yang bersaing dalam mengeluarkan versi fakta berkenaan insiden kekejaman di No Gun Ri:

The Bridge at No Gun Ri[7] menegaskan bahawa dasar ketenteraan Amerika Syarikat dibenarkan menembak dengan menggunakan senjata kepada warga awam yang damai dan bebas (merupakan suatu keadaan) yang tidak menimbulkan ancaman bagi pasukan Amerika.

Pekerjaan kali kedua Major Robert Bateman, telah memenangi Anugerah Colby Colby Award pada April 2004, Robert telah membuat panggilan penegasan yakni menyangkal laporan sebuah AP yang didakwanya memutar belitkan kebenaran atas dasar bahawa, dasar ketenteraan AS adalah tidak jelas dan, dalam hal apapun, tidak diketahui askar di lapangan (medan pertempuran) pada saat kejadian di No Gun Ri. Para wartawan, pada gilirannya, menuduh Bateman sebagai "suatu kempen percubaan dalam melelahkan perihal laporan kewartawanan yang kebal yang padanya pertama dibawa kezaman kavalri ke-7 semasa pembunuhan para pelarian Korea Selatan di No Gun Ri." akaun Bateman's yang didahului pada April 2007 memerihalkan dokumen keluaran Tentera menetapkan dasar formal menembak pelarian adalah "suatu bonus tambahan" keatas tentera Amerika Syarikat.

Kini kita boleh mengetengahkan lima soalan kunci tentang penglibatan AS dalam kerja-kerja pembunuhan di No Gun Ri:

  1. Dalam keadaan apa yang menyebabkan tentera AS di Korea Selatan menyerang para pelarian? Apakah para pelarian orang awam telah mengambil kesempatan terhadap tentera AS atau menyerang tentera? Dalam keadaan apa (situasi) yang menyebabkan tentera Amerika di Korea Selatan menyerang pelarian?
  2. Apakah penyusup bersenjata tentera Korea Utara berada di antara warga awam Korea yang telah dibunuh?
  3. Apakah dasar/polisi ketenteraan AS yang membenarkan serangan terhadap penduduk awam yang tidak berdosa, dan adakah tentera darat yang terjebak dalam insiden itu menyedari hal tersebut?
  4. Apakah orang awam atau strafed dibom oleh serangan udara AS di sekitar No Gun Ri?
  5. Apakah bahan yang menjadi sumber bukti dan adakah responden saksi dan pelaku (pesalah jenayah perang) telah diperiksa dengan berhati-hati dan tepat untuk dibentangkan bagi mencapai pemahaman yang seimbang berkenaan fakta yang berbangkit?

Keluaran artikel daripada Associated Press[sunting | sunting sumber]

Cerita berkenaan skandal jenayah peperangan ini pada mulanya telah dibangkitkan oleh Associated Press dalam tahun 1999[2] dalam artikel bersiri dimana keputusan laporan telah disiasat oleh wartawan AP yang bernama Charles J. Hanley, Sang-Hun Choe, dan Martha Mendoza dan pengkaji AP yang bernama Randy Herschaft, kemudian laporan ini diperbesarkan dengan penerbitan judul buku yang bertajuk, The Bridge at No Gun Ri. Himpunan laporan AP, sebelumnya dokumen yang diwartakan oleh AP sebagai suatu keputusan yang berada di dalam permintaan Akta Kebebasan Informasi. Wartawan AP telah menemubual ramai saksi pembunuhan, termasuk rakyat Korea yang masih terselamat dan askar vateran Regimen Kavalri ke-7 Amerika Syarkat yang masih hidup.

A July 25, 1950 Air Force memorandum states: "The army has requested we strafe all civilian refugee parties that are noted approaching our positions....To date we have complied with the army request in this respect." In 2001, an official Army inquiry turned up no similar document but in April 2007, the Army released a corroborating document in response to a Freedom of Information request by the Associated Press. A memo to the U.S. State Department also confirmed the Air Force memo.

A memo, dated July 25, 1950, from the U.S. Fifth Air Force regarding "Policy on Strafing Civilian Targets", written by USAF Colonel Turner C. Rogers recalls that, "[t]he army has requested that we strafe all civilian refugee parties that are noted approaching our positions," and that, "to date, we have complied with the army request in this respect." The memo says that bands of civilians have either been infiltrated by or are under the control of North Korean soldiers, but recommends that official policy be discriminate in targeting civilians only when "they are definitely known to contain North Korean soldiers or commit hostile acts." Though a similar naval document was located, the first official U.S. Army inquiry, in 2001, did not report turning up such a document. In April 2007, a letter from the U.S. ambassador in South Korea to the State Department in Washington acknowledging the policy order to shoot civilians was revealed by the team of Associated Press reporters .[8]

The book by the AP reporters describes the soldiers as, "green recruits of the U.S. occupation army in Japan thrown unprepared into the frontlines of war, teenagers who viewed unarmed farmers as enemies, led by officers who had never commanded men in battle." The soldiers were wary of civilians as being potential (North) Korean People's Army (NKPA) fighters; there were reports of captured enemy fighters as well as of Russian and Japanese weapons.

No Army documents were found suggesting that an order was given to the regiment at No Gun Ri to shoot civilians, though the AP contends in The Bridge At No Gun Ri that a communications log book which would have evidence of such an order was conveniently missing from the National Archives at the time of their investigation. The AP therefore relied on the testimony of witnesses. AP reporter Martha Mendoza states:

"Some of the veterans recall hearing orders, and we quoted them as hearing those orders to fire on civilians. We also in our reporting described some veterans who did not hear orders. Where those orders came from, we've tried to track down as best we could, and we're looking forward to the Pentagon getting to the bottom of it."

The AP editor of the story, J. Robert Port, said he was demoted after championing the story for more than a year within the AP hierarchy. The AP special assignment division, which Port headed, was dissolved. Port resigned in June 1999. In September 1999, seventeen months after reporting on the story began, the AP published the series of stories. It is the AP's only Pulitzer Prize for investigative reporting.[9]

Challenges to AP articles[sunting | sunting sumber]

An article in U.S. News & World Report by military reporter Joseph L. Galloway questioned the credibility of a witness in the AP report.[4] Using the same Army records as those used by the AP, Galloway demonstrated fraudulent claims by Edward Daily, who had said he both saw the killings at No Gun Ri and heard an order to carry them out. Based on military records, Galloway reported that Daily misrepresented his role to the AP: that he was not a machine gunner and was neither part of the unit at No Gun Ri nor anywhere near the village during the period in question. The AP initially stuck by Daily, who had reaffirmed his statements to numerous media outlets, including an appearance on a Dateline NBC interview with then NBC anchor Tom Brokaw:

Tom Brokaw: You heard that order?
Edward Daily: Yes, sir.
Brokaw: "Kill them all?"
Edward Daily: Yes, sir.

The AP then re-interviewed Daily who, when confronted with army records that conflicted with his statements, admitted he could not have been present during the incident, and instead had heard of it second hand. Daily had been a mechanic during the war and did not join the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry until 1951. In January 2002 he pleaded guilty to defrauding the government by collecting over $400,000 in benefits over 15 years for combat-related trauma from combat he never saw. Daily served a 21-month prison sentence.[10]

In follow-up stories, the AP reporters interviewed other servicemen including Lawrence Levine and James Crume, who worked at the headquarters of the 7th Cavalry Regiment. Both said they believed that orders to shoot civilian refugees came from headquarters, though neither said he'd seen or heard such orders. In interviews, some of the American soldiers at No Gun Ri said they had been ordered to fire on the refugees because their commanders believed that North Korean troops, wearing white so as to look like peasants, had infiltrated the refugee column and were shooting at Americans. Others quoted by the AP referred repeatedly to receiving fire from among the refugees.[4]

The New York Times reporter Felicity Barringer reported that Herman Patterson, a rifleman in the 2nd Battalion, said: "Unfortunately, the incident took place. Numbers are not known exactly." She also reviewed the conflicting news accounts of the events that transpired at No Gun Ri, concluding that at that point (spring, 2000) "in the end, the crucial centerpiece of The A.P. report, the American soldiers killed at least 100 Korean civilians — possibly under direct orders — has been chipped but hardly shattered by the latest revelations."[11] Mr. Hanley also says that arguments about on-the-scene orders overlook two general orders from top commanders. The First Cavalry Division headquarters on July 24 had issued an order saying: "No refugees to cross the front line. Fire everyone trying to cross lines. Use discretion in case of women and children." in fact, the "General Order" was nor an order, just a radio log entry by a Major in a different regiment, unconnected to the 7th Cavalry, and not at No Gun Ri.[12]

The most contested estimates concern the body count. A report of the Yeongdong County Office in South Korea, based upon self-reporting by present-day inhabitants, stated the total number of civilian casualties (injured, missing, or killed) to be 248. Some Korean victims have stated numbers in the hundreds. It's not clear what happened to the remains of those who were killed. Bateman speculates that between eight and 35 Koreans were killed at No Gun Ri, with two to three times that number wounded, due to mortar rounds and then a short bursts (30-90 seconds) of gunfire from the troops which occurred when the troops panicked and believed they were under fire themselves. Bateman wrote that declassified reconnaissance photos revealed no mass of bodies nor graves. Bateman, however, used only U.S. military reconnaissance and did not examine the village or interview any Koreans for his book. AP reporter Hanley has suggested that the dead were not in the open because they were stacked by local villagers beneath soil under parts of the bridge. Bateman contends that the soil required for burying hundreds of corpses even at a shallow level would have meant an excavation of soil so large (the remains alone for 300 small humans would be, roughly, 20 tons) that it would be visible in the photos. The AP contends that Korean witnesses testified to stacking bodies, but Bateman contends that the number of victims are conflated with other incidents in the vicinity during the war, and in the same timeframe. Citing the psychiatric studies, he speculates that none of the Koreans may believe they are lying, and he believes many if not most were fired upon by U.S. troops (he cites at least nine incidents that he found, and suspects dozens of other times where U.S. troops fired upon civilians in that period), just not all at the same time, and in the same place, at No Gun Ri.

As mentioned above, Edward Daily falsely corroborated the AP story and provided colorful descriptions of the incident, although he was not mentioned in the AP report until the 56th paragraph. During their defense of their Pulitzer story, the AP argued Daily was not central to their story, and merely was one witness among sixty they had interviewed. Bateman's book includes e-mails from Hanley which demonstrate that not only did the AP reporters refuse to recognize the flaws in Daily's testimony, but that Daily was more important than the AP suggested. Bateman believes that Daily, as a prominent member of the 7th Cavalry regimental association, had strong influence over other witnesses and that by virtue of his statements, the retired mechanic "contaminated" the views and recollections of other veterans. Additionally, it appears that Daily was central to guiding the AP to the American sources that the AP used, providing them with names, phone numbers, and addresses. Leaning upon the works of academic psychiatrist Elizabeth Loftus, Bateman described what he said was "the plasticity of memory" and susceptibility of some "memories" to outside suggestions from influential figures such as Daily, who had written two books on the history of the unit. Another AP witness inadvertently demonstrated Bateman's point in a front-page article in The New York Times. Veteran Eugene Hesselman denied the charge that Daily was not at No Gun Ri. He said, "I know that Daily was there. I know that. I know that." Bateman is skeptical of the recollections of Hesselman and Private First Class Delos Flint. Bateman claimed they were not present at No Gun Ri after he found records that they had been medically evacuated from the area on July 24th, one day before the events in question. Bateman said the AP did not quote any military men at No Gun Ri who heard an order to fire at civilians, the closest being those who "believed" that there "must have" been an order (Levine and Crume).

Bateman says compelling refugees to halt their advance by firing on them is "the dumbest possible action that could have been taken." Some Korean witnesses describe being strafed and bombed as they walked along the railway. Pictures taken on August 6, 1950, reveal strafing damage. Hanley, the AP reporter, argues that the U.S. forces called in strikes. Bateman argues that this was impossible because of the incompatibility between army and air force radios (AM vs. FM) and the fact that the same unit could not stop a U.S. Air Force strafing of their own position the very next day due to the lack of such radios. Bateman speculates that witnesses may have confused the mortars for bombs, and that the strafing shown in the photographs could have been from that period, or could have been from a later period.

U.S. Army Inspector General report of 2001[sunting | sunting sumber]

Fail:Wonsabu Bridge.jpg
The damaged Wonsabu Bridge in the vicinity of No Gun Ri is shown here from an image taken on August 6, 1950; NIMA officials reported that no pictures suggest evidence of mass graves.
Fail:NoGunRi ImageOverview2.jpg
The vicinity of No Gun Ri is shown here on an aerial image taken on August 6, 1950; the fighting positions of U.S. soldiers are noted.
Fail:NoGunRi ImageRailOverpass.jpg
The double railroad overpass at No Gun Ri is shown close up here in an aerial image taken on August 6, 1950.
Fail:NoGunRi ImageOverview.jpg
The vicinity of No Gun Ri is shown here on an aerial image taken on August 6, 1950; the alleged Northeast strafing area is noted.
Fail:NoGunRi ImageNEStrafing.jpg
The Northeast strafing area is shown close up in this image taken on August 6, 1950.

Following the release of the AP account of No Gun Ri, the U.S. and the R.O.K. began independent parallel investigations. At the direction of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army instructed the Inspector General of the Army to research and report on the No Gun Ri incident. In January 2001 the Inspector General released Report on the No Gun Ri Review.[5] The primary judgments of the review were:

  • The evacuation of South Koreans to the site of the No Gun Ri incident was not at the direction of 7th Cavalry U.S. soldiers, though U.S. involvement cannot be ruled out
  • The strafing of refugees in the No Gun Ri vicinity appears to have occurred either July 26 or July 27, 1950; however, the air strikes were the result of misidentification and not preplanned attacks on civilians
  • There were an undetermined number of civilians killed in the area around No Gun Ri; not all the killings were concentrated at the double rail bridge
  • The deaths and injury of civilians were inherent to war and not a deliberate killing
  • Despite some conflicting evidence, U.S. commanders did not issue oral or written orders to shoot civilians in the vicinity of No Gun Ri

The following is a detailed list of the review's findings:

  • U.S. forces were inadequately trained to deal with mass refugees, an inadequacy that was causing problems on the battlefield.
  • Official policy emphasized the role of South Korean authorities in dealing with refugees.
  • Policies enacted regarding refugees were that they were prohibited from crossing battle lines (positions where there is contact or expectation of contact with the enemy) as well as being subject to a night curfew.
  • The 2nd Battalion of the 7th Cavalry Regiment withdrew from a position east of Yongdong to Nogeun-ri, believing they were under attack; the withdraw was highly disorganized.
  • The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment showed up in the afternoon of the 26th to the east of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, relieving the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment.
  • During July 27 to 29, the forces believed they were under enemy attack.
  • Official policy discouraged large evacuations so as not to clog roads and supply lines; it is unknown why so many were evacuated.
  • U.S. forces were not responsible for the large evacuations in the vicinity; they may have evacuated Imgae-ri but if so they were not 7th Cavalry Regiment soldiers.
  • There were no airstrikes in the afternoon of July 26 in the vicinity of Nogeun-ri. The only airstrikes during this period were a friendly fire incident on July 27 which caused the cavalry commander to request a Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) and a strike on NKPA forces on July 28 near the 1st Battalion.
  • Only TACPs had the ability to communicate with aircraft; there were none in the vicinity during the time period of July 26 to 29.
  • No USAF veterans interviewed participated in the strafing of civilians in the vicinity of Nogeun-ri in late July.
  • The Navy found no evidence of its aircraft in the vicinity except on July 28, when it "attacked a railroad tunnel occupied by enemy troops and other targets forward of the 7th Cavalry in the direction of Yongdong with bombs and machine guns."
  • Images dated August 6 and September 19 show no signs of bombing but, "some patterns near the tracks approximately 350 yards from the double railroad overpass show "an imagery signature of probable strafing"", the same location identified by witnesses as being where they were strafed.
  • No evidence of an air strike on July 26 but number of eyewitnesses shows it can not be precluded.
  • Separate strikes on July 27 and 28 (on friendly and enemy targets, respectively) could have caused civilian casualties.
  • A strike could have occurred in this period which killed civilians but it did not target them.
  • Veterans heard various types of fire near unidentified individuals in civilian clothing outside of the tunnels and bridges in the vicinity; some reported seeing or receiving hostile fire from civilians; other civilians had shots fired near them to prevent them from moving.
  • "Although the U.S. Review Team cannot determine what happened near Nogeun-ri with certainty, it is clear, based upon all available evidence, that an unknown number of Korean civilians were killed or injured by the effects of small-arms fire, artillery and mortar fire, and strafing that preceded or coincided with the NKPA's advance and the withdrawal of U.S. forces in the vicinity of Nogeun-ri during the last week of July 1950. These Korean deaths and injuries occurred at different locations in the vicinity of Nogeun-ri and were not concentrated exclusively at the double railroad overpass."
  • Estimates of the time length of fire range from a few minutes to four days.
  • U.S. commanders did not issue orders to fire on civilians in Nogeun-ri during July 25-29.
  • Pilots were not ordered to kill civilians in the vicinity of Nogeun-ri.
  • Interviewed veterans said deadly force was not authorized against civilians who posed no threat, and they were not given orders to shoot and kill civilians.
  • Some veterans believed they had the ability to use deadly force if civilians did not halt from passing their position.
  • Some veterans believed there was an order to fire on civilians because the weapons used may have hit civilians; they did not hear any such order and do not know who would have given it or when; other veterans maintain there was no such order.
  • There was a reference to firing upon civilians who refused to stop in an army log of the 8th Cavalry Regiment; this regiment was not in the vicinity during the time period and there is nothing suggesting this message was transmitted to other regiments.
  • The number of casualties is unascertainable by witnesses; the 248 figure is unverified.

The summary concludes:

Neither the documentary evidence nor the U.S. veterans’ statements reviewed by the U.S. Review Team support a hypothesis of deliberate killing of Korean civilians. What befell civilians in the vicinity of Nogeun-ri in late July 1950 was a tragic and deeply regrettable accompaniment to a war forced upon unprepared U.S. and ROK forces.

Aftermath[sunting | sunting sumber]

In 1999 the New York Times reported that 30 South Korean survivors and relatives of victims had filed a lawsuit in 1997 that "described a three-day period of killing, saying that American planes had strafed hundreds of refugees who were fleeing from North Korean troops, leaving about 100 people dead. The survivors fled under the bridge, where they said they were pinned by American troops who shot and killed almost all the refugees." Their suit was rejected on a technicality.[13]

President Bill Clinton expressed U.S. regret over Korean civilian deaths.[14] The United States and South Korea issued a joint "statement of mutual understanding" in January 2001, which stated that there were no orders to fire on civilians. It concluded the following:

Because of the passage of 50 years and the effects of the conflict, the statements of Korean witnesses and U.S. veterans about the number of refugees killed, injured or missing as the result of the events in the vicinity of No Gun Ri vary widely. The Koreans have reported to the Office of Yong Dong County an unverified number of 248 Korean civilians killed, injured or missing while the testimony of U.S. veterans supports lower numbers.

Bearing in mind the enduring suffering of the victims, the Korean and American Review Teams mutually understand that:

In the desperate opening weeks of defensive combat in the Korean War, U.S. soldiers killed or injured an unconfirmed number of Korean refugees in the last week of July 1950 during a withdrawal under pressure in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. The diligent and conscientious bilateral efforts of both countries in this review represent a significant contribution to the maintenance of the vital and long-standing ROK-U.S. alliance. Bearing in mind the long-lasting sorrow of victims as well as the sacrifice of U.S. soldiers during the Korean War, the ROK and U.S. teams firmly believe that this investigation on an incident that occurred during the Korean War will not only help maintain a more stable ROK-U.S. alliance but also is an example of two nations working together to realize the value of democracy and recognize the importance of human rights.

Ongoing research[sunting | sunting sumber]

On February 23, 2004, the History News Network hosted an online debate between Robert Bateman and the AP reporters who wrote the series of investigative articles in 1999.

According to historian Sahr Conway-Lanz, the position taken by the Pentagon after its 1999-2001 investigation — that the U.S. military did not order the refugees shot — is untenable.[15] In an April 2006 book, Conway-Lanz published a letter from then U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, John J. Muccio,[16] informing the State Department that U.S. troops were authorized to shoot at refugees. The letter referred to policy set down on July 25, 1950.[17]

On May 29, 2006, the Associated Press reported in a story that was printed in The Washington Post that the letter, cited by Conway-Lenz, which had not previously been known, "is the strongest indication yet that such a policy existed for all U.S. forces in Korea, and (is) the first evidence that that policy was known to upper ranks of the U.S. government."[18]

The Associated Press reported on April 12, 2007, that the Army has acknowledged it found — but did not divulge in 2001 when it issued its official inquiry — that a high-level document revealed the U.S. military had a policy of shooting approaching civilians in South Korea. The article said the document was one of numerous omissions of documents and testimony pointing to a policy of firing on refugee groups in the army's investigation.[8]

The document, a letter from the U.S. ambassador in South Korea to the State Department in Washington, is dated the day in 1950 when U.S. troops began the No Gun Ri shootings, in which survivors say hundreds, mostly women and children, were killed.[8]

Bateman's 2002 book, however, reproduced the entire military order which came out of that same high-level US-ROK meeting, and did so verbatim. These were the instructions that went from that highest level down to the divisions, and from there to the regiments, and from there to the battalions, over the next days. The letter, from the U.S. Ambassador to Korea to the State Department, describing the meeting out of which the orders flowed does not matter to military events on the ground at No Gun Ri. The AP articles on the topic try to suggest conspiracy on the part of the historians working on President Clinton's investigation. The State Department, however, did not command military troops in the field in Korea, and so the letter serves only as evidence impugning the credibility of any other government statement saying that orders had not been given. The Ambassador's letter may be irrelevant to the investigation of events that occurred the next day at No Gun Ri beyond establishing the mere existence of discussion of general orders at a high level regarding shooting refugees feared to contain hostile forces.

Lihat juga[sunting | sunting sumber]

Rujukan[sunting | sunting sumber]

  1. 1.0 1.1 "노근리양민학살사건 (老斤里良民虐殺事件)" (dalam bahasa Korea). Ensiklopedia Doosan. 
  2. 2.0 2.1 2.2 "2000 Pulitzer Prize Winners — Investigative Reporting: Bridge at No Gun Ri". Pulitzer.org. Diperolehi pada 2008-08-17. 
  3. 3.0 3.1 3.2 GI Korea (2007-01-14). "Controversies of the Korean War: The Tragedy at No Gun-ri - Part #2". ROK DROP Blog. Diperolehi pada 2007-04-14. 
  4. 4.0 4.1 4.2 Galloway, Joseph L. (2000-05-22). "Doubts About a Korean Massacre: American soldiers allegedly slaughtered hundreds of innocent refugees at a place called No Gun Ri. A new review of the facts challenges that claim". U.S. News & World Report. Diperolehi pada 2007-04-14. 
  5. 5.0 5.1 5.2 U.S. Department of Army Inspector General (January 2001). "Report of the No Gun Ri Review". Diperolehi pada 2006-07-15. 
  6. GI Korea (2007-03-22). "No Gun Ri misreporting continues". ROK DROP Blog. Diperolehi pada 2007-04-14. 
  7. Ackerman, Seth (Sept./Oct. 2000). "Digging Too Deep at No Gun Ri: AP's massacre exposés survived corporate pressure and criticism--but not apathy". FAIR: Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting. Diperolehi pada 2007-04-14. 
  8. 8.0 8.1 8.2 Hanley, Charles J.; Martha Mendoza (2007-04-13). "Letter reveals U.S. intent at No Gun Ri". New Orleans Times-Picayune (Associated Press). Diperolehi pada 2007-04-14. 
  9. Port, J. Robert (2002). "The Story No One Wanted to Hear". Dalam Kristina Borjesson. Into the Buzzsaw: Leading Journalists Expose the Myth of a Free Press. Prometheus Books. ISBN 1-57392-972-7. OCLC 48966808. Diperolehi pada 2007-04-14. 
  10. Greer, Judith (2002-06-03). "What really happened at No Gun Ri?". Salon. Diperolehi pada 2007-04-15. 
  11. Barringer, Felicity (2000-05-22). "A Press Divided: Disputed Accounts of a Korean War Massacre". New York Times. pp. C1. Diarkibkan daripada asal pada unknown date. Diperolehi pada 2007-04-15. 
  12. Responding to the Bridge at No Gun Ri
  13. Becker, Elizabeth (1999-10-01). "U.S. to Revisit Accusations of a Massacre by G.I.'s in '50". The New York Times. Diperolehi pada 2007-04-15. 
  14. BBC News (2001-01-11). "US 'deeply regrets' civilian killings". BBC News Online. Diperolehi pada 2007-04-15. 
  15. Conway-Lanz, Sahr (January 2005). "Beyond No Gun Ri". Diplomatic History 29 (1): 49–81. ISSN 0145-2096. "However, new evidence missed by previous investigations demonstrates the Pentagon’s interpretation to be untenable." 
  16. Muccio was ambassador from 7 April 1949 to 8 September 1952. See Chiefs of Mission: Korea
  17. Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). Collateral Damage: Americans, Noncombatant Immunity, and Atrocity after World War II. New York: Routledge. ISBN 9780415978286. OCLC 62281403. 
  18. Hanley, Charles J.; Martha Mendoza (2006-05-29). "U.S. Policy Was to Shoot Korean Refugees". The Washington Post (Associated Press). Diperolehi pada 2007-04-15. 

Bacaan lanjut[sunting | sunting sumber]

Koordinat: 36°10′30″N 127°46′30″W / 36.175°U 127.775°B / 36.175; -127.775